2008/03/27

Abu Graib and the Stanford Prison Experiment

According to the Stanford Prison Experiment, Dr. Zimbardo believes that the Lucifer Effect explains how ordinary people become evil in reaction to the situation in which they were placed. He believes that what happened in Abu Ghraib could be explained by the experiment in 1971. Therefore, the prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib is caused by the conditions in the prison. In other words, it is the barrel that corrupts, not the human nature.

The Sanford Prison Experiment seems to parallel the prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib, yet what happened in Abu Ghraib still differ from the experiment. The experiment selected people with sound mental condition while some of the soldiers in Abu Ghraib were contractors without such guarantee of sound mind and least tendency toward violence. By holding psychological test, the experiment controls the personality as a variable and reduced its effect. In real life, personality still accounts for the events. The conclusion of the Stanford Prison Experiment somehow implied the bad apples theory. According to the slides, there are three types of guards. Some guards never punished prisoners, while others dehumanized prisoners in a hostile way. One situation resulted in different reactions. Bad apples still matter.

Nevertheless, the Stanford Prison Experiment echoes with Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse. The situationist theory of Dr. Zimbardo states that the situation determines one’s behavior. US government creates a situation of prison without adequate supervision and transparency, and allows a group of people who lack of proper training of interrogation skill to work in Abu Graib. This is a bad barrel that could induce the evil of bad apples.

2008/02/22

Cluster Bombs


During the class discussion, the question about cluster munitions interested me. Cluster bombs seem to be an indiscriminate weapon whose unexploded bomblets function like landmines and pose significant lethal threat to civilians. There is global movement banning AP-mines. What did the international community do concerning cluster munitions? Is there any actor who advocate for banning cluster bombs?

The treaty negotiation process has been supported by a group of countries, including Norway, Austria, Ireland, Mexico and Peru, since February 2007 and it’s known as the “Oslo Process.” There have been 4 conferences so far, and the next one is scheduled in May 2008 in Dublin. Civil society also formed a network, Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), which aims at calling for a conclusion of an international treaty banning cluster munitions. The concern on cluster munitions was brought up in the latest session of DISEC (UNGA 1st Committee on Disarmament and International Security) and Conference on Disarmament. According to the CMC, the participants of the Oslo Process “cover the five world regions and include 19 producer states, 7 states that have used cluster munitions and 34 stockpilers." [1]

The major content of the draft Cluster Munitions Convention is similar to the existing disarmament provisions. The treaty would prohibit states from using, producing, stockpiling and transferring cluster bombs, and make states responsible for cleaning the remnants and helping the cluster munitions victims. [2]
[2] Draft of the Cluster Munitions Convention, Wellington Conference, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom http://www.wilpf.int.ch/disarmament/clustermunitions/

2008/02/14

Omar Khadr


Omar Khadr, accused of war crimes and assisting Al Quade, has been imprisoned in Guantanamo since 2002. He was only 15 when he was captured. Is prosecuting a child under the age of 18 violates international law? Can a 15-year-old child commit war crime?

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art.38) and the Rome Statute (Part 2, Art.8(2)(b)(xxvi)) prohibits children under the age of 15 form taking part in hostilities. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on Rights of the Child (Art.1) and the 1st Additional Protocol (Art.77) to the Geneva Convention forbids the use of children under 18 in combat. However, these provisions create responsibility for states that use child soldiers, and United States is not a party to these treaties.

According to the past practice, for example, the Chief Prosecutor of Sierra Leone, David Crane, refused to prosecute any child soldiers under the age of 18. Moreover, in the domestic law of the United States, the minimum age for joining the armed forces is 17.

From the above, it’s reasonable to assume that there is a customary international law that anyone under the age of 18 shall receive special protection. In fact, whether prosecuting a minor violates the international law, the inhumane interrogations violate the basic principle of Geneva Convention and human rights. The Omar Khadr just makes the Guantanamo Bay detention camps even more disgraceful.

2008/01/29

norms v. behavior


So this week was about Geneva Regime and the concept of “norm.” In order to make sure I really understand the idea of regulative and constitutive norm effects, I googled and happened to find an article at The Duck of Minerva, Norm’s my uncle by Dr. Daniel Nexon. It was quite helpful. Here I will elaborate my thoughts on norms, behavior and interests with two examples: yielding seats to seniors and disabled people and the US-led NATO bombing of Chinese embassy.



When taking a bus or a metro, one should yield the seats to those in need: the elderly, the disabled and expectant mothers, etc. In order to explain the constitutive and regulative effect of this norm, I rephrase this norm into the form suggested by Dr. Nexon: "if an actor is type X in situation S, then s/he should do action A." If an actor is a youth or a prime-age adult in the situation of taking a public transport, then s/he should yield the seat to infirm passengers.

This norm has regulative effect in that there is fairly strong compliance and that violation might be criticized. Not yielding seats to infirm passengers might be considered but avoided. Besides, not yielding seats to those in need may be criticized by others. This norm has constitutive effect in that it constitutes the identity of youth or prime-age adults.

Most of the time, I conform to this norm, but I violate it at times when the trip is long and I am not feeling well. In case I don’t want to yield seats, I sort of deny the violation to this norm by taking a preventive measure: taking a nap and not noticing those passengers coming up at the following stops. In the mean time, I justify my behavior to myself by finding an excuse: I’m not feeling well. Apparently, the norm of yielding seats to infirm passengers strongly governs my everyday behavior. Although I violate this norm occasionally, the regulative effect is still strong.



As a state, one of the primary actors in Geneva Regime, it can only attack military targets in wartime. Civilian objects should not be targeted. In other words, if an actor is a state in the situation of armed conflicts, it should not target civilian objects.

On May 7 1999, a US B-2 bomber bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo crisis, killing three Chinese reporters. China denounced US’s bombing through media and demonstrated outside US embassy or consulates in China. NATO apologized and claim that it was an accident caused by an outdated map provided by CIA. In October 1999, US and China agreed upon the payment for damage and for the family of those who died and injured. [1] Some believes that NATO deliberately bombed the Chinese embassy after US had discovered that Chinese Embassy in Belgrade had constantly provided communication for Milosevic's forces. [2]

In this case, the norm of not attacking civilian objects was violated by the United States in order to gain national interests. This norm has regulative effect in that China strongly condemn US’s behavior and US apologized as well as tried to explain the “accidental” bombing with various “excuses.” This norm has constitutive effect in that it constitutes the role of actors who are parties to a conflict and the categories of military versus civilian targets.



Although rules of war are frequently violated in the field, I’m still optimistic about this regime and all these rules and norms. Combatants may not abide by the principle of distinction all the time, however, the fundamental principles of Geneva Regime still put “not targeting civilians” on one’s mind most of the time. Using force against civilians or dual targets are considered as the last resort when there is crucial military interests in attacking them or when attacking them is the only way to reach important military goals. Even though the violation to IHL usually is far from “unthinkable” during armed conflict, these norms still have certain regulative or constitutive effects.



[1] NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_bombing_of_the_Chinese_embassy_in_Belgrade

[2] Nato bombed Chinese deliberately, Guardian Unlimited
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,203214,00.html
US Air Strike on Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 was Deliberate, Global Research
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20051229&articleId=1665

2008/01/24

Three Kings and the Crimes of War



Hors de Combat: Are we shooting?

"Are we shooting? Are we shooting people or what?" At the beginning of the movie, Sergeant Troy Barlow (Mark Wahlberg) fired his M16 at an Iraqi soldier who’s waiving a white
handkerchief or something.

Waiving a white flag is widely recognized as a signal of truce and request for negotiation. White flag as a “flag of truce” is codified in the Hague Convention IV Art. 32, though the primary purpose of this article is about parlementaire, not surrender. This is could be considered as a customary law.

Art. 32
A person is regarded as a parlementaire who has been authorized by one of the belligerents to enter into communication with the other, and who advances bearing a white flag. He has a right to inviolability, as well as the trumpeter, bugler or drummer, the flag-bearer and interpreter who may accompany him.
---The Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907.

According to the Art. 41 of the Additional Protocol I, a soldier making surrender should be treated as hors de combat, who should not be a target.

Art 41. Safeguard of an enemy hors de combat

1. A person who is recognized or who, in the circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de combat shall not be made the object of attack.

2. A person is hors de combat if:(a) he is in the power of an adverse Party;(b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or(c) he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself;provided that in any of these cases he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.

---Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.

In this case, the Iraqi Regular Army soldier showed his intention to surrender by waiving a white handkerchief, while he still carried a gun publicly, which constitutes one of the legal criterion for a combatant. (Art. 4, Geneva Convention III) Hence, there is room for the Sergeant to argue that shooting the Iraqi soldier did not violate Art. 41 of Protocol One.

Torture: What’s the problem with Michael Jackson?

Sergeant Troy Barlow, shot by the Iraqi rebel during the firefight outside the bunker and affected by the CS gas, was captured by the Iraqi soldiers. They locked him in the interrogation room, force him to drink oil and use electric shock on him.

Though the right of POW is granted in Geneva Convention III (esp.Art.13), in this case, Sergeant Barlow may not be granted the legal status of POW. The situation considered in Convention III is an international armed conflict, which does not seem to exist in between US and Iraq at that time. Nevertheless, with a gunshot in his chest and affected by the CS gas, Sergeant Barlow is wounded person that should be take care of according to the Common Article 3 and the Art.15 of Geneva Convention I:

Art. 15.
At all times, and particularly after an engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures to search for and collect the wounded and sick, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.

--- Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949.


Besides, CS gas is prohibited by the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention. Although Iraq is not a party to the CWC, using the weapons that would cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering is forbidden by the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 and the Protocol I Art. 35. This principle should be regarded as a customary law.


The Principle of Distinction: Unnecessary shot?

During the firefight in the village, an Iraqi rebel shot a woman to death. The Iraqi rebel violates the basic principle of IHL, the principle of distinction, which is codified in Art. 48 of Protocol I:

Art 48. Basic rule
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.

---Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.



Three Kings also raised other issues such as IDPs and Anti-personnel mines. Part of this film reminded me of another war movie, Jarhead. When the US Army soldiers disarm Iraqi POW with a rude manner, I kind of see the absurdity of war that Three Kings and Jarhead tried to disclose with a sense of dark humor.

2008/01/17

Lt. Ehren Watada: a legal refusal or a political decision?

The article “One Young Hero versus the Mighty Military” argues that Lt. Ehren Watada’s refusal to be deployed in Iraq is based on three legal documents: the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Convention and the Nuremberg Principle. However, the author’s interpretation of the international law mentioned in the article is arguable. Besides, jus ad bellum seems to be confused with jus in bello.

The author argues that the Iraq War was “prosecuted in violation of the United Nations Charter.” The UN Charter outlaws use or threat of use of force (Art.2 Sec.4.) Self-defense of Art.51 and collective security of Chapter 7 are two exceptions to this principle, while the Iraq War was none of them. Hence, the Iraq War is unlawful.

The author further argues that the Iraq War constitutes a war of aggression, which is outlawed by the Geneva Conventions of which US is a signer. To be more precise, U.S. is a party to the Geneva Conventions, not only a signer. As far as I know, prohibition of aggression is not expressed in the articles of the Geneva Convention.


Then the author claims that “officers do have the obligation to refuse unlawful orders” according to the Nuremberg Principles. Nevertheless, I think the Nuremberg Principles are distorted here. The purpose of Article IV, “the fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him” is to rule out the possibility of getting rid of individual responsibility by claiming that the illegal action was done due to the superior’s order. The principle itself did not make refusing unlawful order an obligation.

Lastly, following an order of deploying in Iraq hardly constitutes war crimes or crimes against peace. Only “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression” would constitute a crime against peace. The action of aggression focuses on jus ad bellum and the starting of the war, while the deployment of Lt. Watada was not part of the planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war at the starting point. In addition, whether a war is illegal or illegitimate has nothing to do with war crimes, which are defined as violations of jus in bello according to the Rome Statue. An order is unlawful when it would lead to grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, serious violation of IHL, violation of Common Article 3 or other humanitarian laws and customs. Lt. Watada’s refusal seems like a political or moral decision rather than a decision on legal basis.

2008/01/13

Angel King

Do you know why I do what I do? I mean, there are more prestigious assignments. Keeping track of nuclear arsenals. You’d think that more critical to world security, but it’s not. No, nine out of 10 war victims today are killed with assault rifles and small arms like yours. Those nuclear missiles, they sit in their silos. Your AK-47, that is the real weapon of mass destruction.
~ Lord of War

I was working on a project on weapons of mass destruction, especially on nuclear weapons, when I first watched this movie.

Although war is no longer a legitimate tool of statecraft as it was centuries ago, bullets change the government in many countries nowadays. AK-47 has been the most effective weapon that could change warfare for it is so cheap, accessible well-functioned and indestructible. Every year, around a quarter million people are killed by the AK-47. However, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) is not just a problem of illicit trade, but a problem of politics. Strong powers could support a certain side of the conflict in a low profile through intelligence agencies and arms dealers. Given the power politics behind SALW and the nature of contemporary conflicts, the practical protection for civilians, especially children and women became a complex issue.

This is why I am interested in rules of war or human security. These immediate threats to human beings.